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ATTORNEY ADVERTISING IN MARYLAND: A NEED
FOR STRICTER CONTROL
After the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, Maryland was forced to redraft its regu-
lations on attorney advertising. Instead of adopting a strict,
constitutionally acceptable standard promoting the informative
purpose of advertising, the Court of Appeals of Maryland em-
braced a more lenient, less protective standard This comment
traces the origin and development of regulations governing at-
torney advertising and advocates the adoption of a more strin-
gent standard
I. INTRODUCTION
Only within the last seventy-five years has the legal profession felt
the need to regulate the conduct of its members. Initially, regulations
included a provision sanctioning advertising. Shortly thereafter, how-
ever, the American Bar Association (ABA) issued its Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics which included a ban on all attorney advertising. This
ban has remained in effect until recently when the United States
Supreme Court decreed that the information capable of being con-
veyed through advertising should be allowed to reach the consuming
public. This information allows the public to compare the services of-
fered by attorneys. Since this decision, states have been attempting to
formulate satisfactory regulations of attorney advertising.
Because advertising is commercial speech, it may be more strictly
regulated than other forms of speech. In addition, due to the sensitive
nature of attorney advertising and the enhanced possibility of decep-
tion, advertising by attorneys may be even more strictly regulated than
other forms of commercial speech. Maryland, however, has elected to
disregard these inherent differences in favor of a bare, threshold stan-
dard above which all constitutional speech must rise. In so doing,
Maryland has handicapped the very purpose which the advertising
seeks to promote. Although attorney advertising is a valuable con-
sumer resource, left unharnessed its informative purpose may be al-
lowed to succumb to persuasion and gimmickry.
This comment discusses the purpose behind attorney advertising
by analyzing its history. In light of this history and purpose, Mary-
land's regulations fall well short of the level needed to protect the infor-
mational purpose attorney advertising was designed to promote.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Advertising and the Legal Profession
Early English history is silent as to the regulation of attorney ad-
vertising. The practice of law was viewed as a form of public service
rather than a means of earning a living. Since the profession was not
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considered to be a form of commercial trade, attorney advertising was
not common. The legal profession merely monitored itself according to
"unwritten traditions, part social manners, part fraternal etiquette [and]
part ethics proper."'
In the United States, however, where the practice of law was
viewed as a form of commerce, advertising by attorneys became more
prevalent. As the nation expanded and the number of attorneys multi-
plied, there arose a need for a clear demarcation between ethical and
unethical conduct.
In 1887, the Alabama State Bar Association adopted the first writ-
ten Code of Ethics.2 This Code contained the first regulation of attor-
ney advertising. In particular, Canon 16 permitted advertising to the
general public but warned that "special solicitation of particular indi-
viduals to become clients ought to be avoided."3 This regulation was
the first to recognize a distinction between the presentation of informa-
tion to the public and the use of persuasive techniques to attract indi-
vidual clients.
Several years later, in 1908, the ABA published the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics,4 which were eventually adopted by every state. These
thirty-two canons provided general ethical concepts and guidelines by
which each member of the legal profession was required to abide.
With few exceptions, the ABA's canons mirrored those of the Alabama
code. The most notable exception, however, was ABA Canon 27,
which barred all attorney advertising, including that which was
designed simply to inform the public about available services.' The
ABA reinforced its total ban on advertising by positing that "[tihe most
worthy and effective advertisement possible. . . is the establishment of
a well-merited reputation."6
B. Commercial Speech Doctrine as an Exception to the First
Amendment
The prohibition on advertising was not limited to the legal field;
indeed, other professions found themselves similarly situated.7 The ju-
dicial system offered little assistance to attorneys or other professionals
I. J. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 41 (1978).
2. ALA. CODE OF ETHICS (1887), reprinted in H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 352 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as DRINKER].
3. ALA. CODE OF ETHICS CANON 16 (1887), reprinted in DRINKER, supra note 2, at
356.
4. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1907), reprinted in DRINKER,
supra note 2, at 309.
5. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 27 (1907), reprinted in
DRINKER, supra note 2, at 316-18.
6. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 27 (1907), reprinted in
DRINKER, supra note 2, at 316-18.
7. See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424
(1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Semler v. Oregon State
Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
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who sought to advertise. For instance, in Semler v. Oregon State Board
of Dental Examiners,8 a dentist challenged a local statute which listed
advertising by a dentist as a ground for revocation of a professional
license. The Supreme Court upheld the statute, stating that the legisla-
ture was entitled to regulate in any area it considered susceptible of
fraud and deception.9 Neither the Court nor the parties perceived the
first amendment to have any application to professional advertising.
The Court's holding, however, was consistent with the then prevailing
notion that advertising was firmly outside the protection of the first
amendment. 'o
It was not until 1942 that the Supreme Court formally recognized
this exclusion from first amendment protection by what has since come
to be known as the commercial speech doctrine. In Valentine v.
Chrestensen,I a distributor of handbills advertising the exhibition for
profit of his submarine was warned by New York City police that this
distribution violated the Sanitary Code.'2 This Code forbade the dis-
tribution in the streets of commercial and business advertising matter. 13
The advertiser was further advised that handbills solely devoted to in-
formation or public protest might freely be distributed.'" In response,
he had printed a double-faced handbill, one side displaying the com-
mercial advertisement and the other side protesting the actions of the
City Dock Department.15 He was, however, restrained by the police
from distributing the handbills. 6 In his suit against the police commis-
sioner, the advertiser cited the first amendment to support his petition
seeking to enjoin the police from enforcing the ordinance. Although
the lower court issued the injunction, 7 the Supreme Court later re-
versed, holding purely commercial speech to be outside the protection
of the Constitution.' 8 The Chrestensen Court distinguished between
communication of information and opinion, on the one hand, and
purely commercial advertising 9 on the other. The latter was believed
8. 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
9. Id at 611.
10. Comment, Attorney Advertising is Commercial Speech Protected by the First
Amendment: Bates v. State Bar, 37 MD. L. REV. 350 (1977); Note, Three Years
Later.- State Court Interpretations of the Attorney's Right to Advertise and the Pub-
lic's Right to Information, 45 Mo. L. REV. 562 (1980).
11. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
12. Id at 53.
13. Id n.l. "No person shall ... distribute, or cause to be . . . distributed, any
handbill, circular, card, booklet, placard or other advertising matter whatsoever in
or upon any street or public place. . . . This section is not intended to prevent
the lawful distribution of anything other than commercial and business advertis-
ing matter." Id
14. Id at 53.
15. Id
16. Id
17. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 34 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
18. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), rev'g 34 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
19. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 54.
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to be devoid of informational value and therefore without first amend-
ment protection. The Court cited no authority for this proposition. In
disposing of the advertiser's argument that his handbill was, in part, a
protest and therefore constitutionally protected, the Court described
the two-sided handbill as a pretext to validate a purely commercial ad-
vertisement.2" Thus, with the birth of the commercial speech doctrine
in Chrestensen, purely commercial speech was expressly held to be
outside the scope of the first amendment. This form of speech was dis-
tinguished from constitutionally protected communications that con-
veyed information or rendered an opinion.
This artificial segregation of purely commercial speech from pro-
tected communications was compromised in the cases that followed
Chrestensen. With one exception,2 ' the commercial speech doctrine
was never employed by the Supreme Court as a basis for denying first
amendment protection.22 The Court instead decided that the speech at
issue was not purely commercial and therefore was not wholly outside
the protection of the first amendment. 3
The Chrestensen holding, however, was expressly limited by the
Supreme Court in Bigelow v. Virginia,24 wherein the Court held that
first amendment protection may not be denied to speech merely be-
cause it is presented in the form of a commercial advertisement. 25 In
Bigelow, the advertisement at issue contravened a Virginia ordinance
making it a misdemeanor to advertise, publish, or circulate a publica-
tion encouraging the procurement of an abortion.26 The Supreme
Court of Virginia, in affirming the conviction, 7 relied on the commer-
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for
the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and dissemi-
nating opinions and that, though the states. . . may appropriately regu-
late the privilege in the public interest they may not unduly burden or
proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally
clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as
respects purely commercial advertising.
Id
20. Id at 55.
21. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
22. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 759 (1976).
23. See, e.g., New York v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 533 (1945); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943); Jamison
v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943).
24. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
25. Id at 818.
26. Id at 812. "If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement or by the sale or
circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, encourage or prompt the
procuring of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Id at
812-13. In Bigelow, the newspaper had published an advertisement of a New
York City organization, The Women's Pavillion, announcing their services for
women with unwanted pregnancies. The advertisement offered information and
counseling and stated that abortions were legal in New York. Id at 812.
27. Bigelow, 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972).
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cial speech doctrine when it stated that the first amendment guarantee
of free speech was inapplicable to commercial advertisements.28
The Supreme Court, in reversing the decision of the state court,29
reinterpreted its holding in Chrestensen. 30 The Court suggested that
"[tihe case obviously does not support any sweeping proposition that
advertising is unprotected per se. 3 1 The Court retreated from its pre-
vious strict classification analysis in favor of a less rigid balancing test.
The Bigelow Court then determined that prior to classifying speech as
purely commercial, a court must determine whether there are any com-
municative aspects to the advertisement. If found to be present, a court
must then weigh those informational portions protected by the first
amendment against the unprotected commercial speech. If the former
outweigh the latter, the advertisement will be granted limited protec-
tion. In Bigelow, portions of the advertisement conveyed "information
of potential interest and value to a diverse audience."32 The Supreme
Court determined that this protected aspect of the newspaper advertise-
ment outweighed the commercial portion and therefore brought the ad-
vertisement outside the classification of purely commercial speech.
Further application of this balancing test by the Supreme Court was
never required, however, for the commercial speech exception to the
first amendment was expressly laid to rest the following Term.
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council,33 the Court invalidated the premise that commercial speech
contains no redeeming informational value. Speech that does no more
than propose a purely commercial transaction - "I will sell you the X
prescription drug at the Y price" 34 - was held not to be wholly outside
the protection of the first amendment. 35 The Virginia Pharmacy Court
declared that "[i]f there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all
First Amendment protection . . . it must be distinguished by its con-
tent. Yet the speech whose content deprives it of protection cannot
simply be speech on a commercial subject. ' 36 The Court again em-
ployed a balancing test, weighing a state's interest in suppression of the
advertisement against the value of the prohibited information.37 The
28. Id at 195, 191 S.E.2d at 176.
29. 421 U.S. 809 (1975), rev'g 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972).
30. The commercial speech doctrine enunciated in Chrestensen had been criticized by
members of the Court. Justice Douglas, who joined in the 1942 Chrestensen opin-
ion, later commented "[t]he ruling was casual, almost offhand. And it had not
survived reflection." Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
31. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820 (1975).
32. Id at 822.
33. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
34. Id at 761.
35. Id at 762.
36. Id at 761.
37. This balancing test differs from the Bigelow balancing test. The Virginia Phar-
macy test begins with the premise that even pure commercial speech is protected
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greater the societal interest in the communication, the lesser the state's
ability to regulate it. After Virginia Pharmacy, all speech, including
commercial speech, was presumed to be entitled to some first amend-
ment protection.
In Virginia Pharmacy, the societal interests proffered focused on
the informational value present even in the purest of commercial
speech.3" The Court reasoned that this information ensures that con-
sumer decisions are made intelligently and, further, that these innumer-
able private economic decisions enable the free enterprise system to
function properly.39 On a more individual level, the Virginia Pharmacy
Court suggested that those most injured by the silencing of drug price
advertising were the aged, the poor, and the sick. Lifting the prohibi-
tion on this advertising would enable these consumers to locate the
lowest market price for their needed medications.40
Several justifications were offered for banning drug price advertis-
ing. First, the state has an interest in maintaining a high degree of
professionalism on the part of licensed pharmacists.4 Second, con-
sumers are better kept in ignorance because advertising would cause
them to gravitate towards the lower ?riced pharmacists, thereby driving
other pharmacists out of business.4 Third, advertising by individual
pharmacists would cause the public to lose respect for the profession as
a whole.4 3 The Court referred to these state interests as "highly pater-
nalistic"" and determined that they were greatly outweighed by the
value to the public of the prohibited information. "[Pleople will per-
ceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed
",45
The Virginia Pharmacy Court, however, did not propose to make
commercial speech indistinguishable from other forms of protected
speech. 46 The Court noted two distinguishing factors.47 First, commer-
by the first amendment. Therefore, unless the state can enunciate sufficient justifi-
cation to ban a particular advertisement, it may not ban the advertisement. By
contrast, the Bigelow test begins with the proposition that pure commercial speech
is outside the protection of the first amendment. Thus, if the speech in question is
purely commercial, the state is free to prohibit it.
38. Even pure commercial advertising disseminates information as to "who is produc-
ing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price." Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
39. Id
40. Id. at 763-64.
41. Id at 766.
42. Id at 767-68.
43. Id at 768.
44. Id at 770. The state's arguments centered on the benefits to be gained by the
professions in keeping consumers in ignorance. For example, the Court rejected
arguments that pharmacists would be able to retain their customers by preventing
access to information that would enable the customers to shop around.
45. Id
46. While the Court noted that untruthful speech has never been protected by the first
amendment regardless of whether it is classified as commercial or otherwise, it
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cial speech is more easily capable of being verified by its originator.48
Second, commercial speech is more "durable"49 than other forms of
speech, thereby lessening the chilling effect of regulations.5" Therefore,
the Court suggested a need for a different degree of regulation to en-
sure the unimpaired flow of truthful and legitimate commercial
information.5'
An issue deliberately left unresolved by the Court was the regula-
tion of advertising by professions other than pharmacists.52 Whereas
pharmacists offer standardized products, services advertised by other
professionals, such as attorneys and physicians, are less tangible and
more diversified. Justice Blackmun, the author of the Virginia Phar-
macy opinion, stated that because of the enhanced opportunity for de-
ception and misinformation, each profession must be considered
separately within its own subset of factors.5 3
C. Attorney Advertising-Bates v. State Bar of Arizona
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of attorney advertis-
ing in the 1977 case of Bates v. State Bar ofArizona. 14 Specifically, the
issue presented was whether lawyers have the constitutional right to
advertise the availability of, and the prices at which, certain routine
services could be performed.55 Bates originated with a complaint filed
by the State Bar of Arizona charging two attorneys with violating the
disciplinary rules of the Arizona Code of Professional Responsibility.56
The attorneys operated a legal clinic that accepted only routine cases
which lended themselves to standardization. As a result, the attorneys
were able to charge relatively low fees. To make this venture profita-
ble, a high volume of business was required, and toward this end, an
advertisement was placed in an Arizona newspaper informing the pub-
stated that "much commercial speech is not provable false, or even wholly false,
but only deceptive or misleading. We forsee no obstacle to a State's dealing effec-
tively with this problem." Id at 771.
47. Id at n.24.
48. Id
49. The term "durable" was used by the Court to show that "[s]ince advertising is the
sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by
proper regulation and forgone entirely." Id
50. Id
51. Id
52. Id at 773 n.25. The Court in Virginia Pharmacy stated that "we have considered
in this case the regulation of commercial advertising by pharmacists. Although
we express no opinion as to other professions, the distinctions, historical and func-
tional, between professions may require consideration of quite different factors."
Id
53. Id
54. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
55. Id at 367-68.
56. The Arizona Code of Professional Responsibility is incorporated in Rule 29(a) of
the Supreme Court Rules of Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Sup. Ct. Rules,
Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 29(a) (Supp. 1983).
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lic of the existence of the clinic. The advertisement violated Discipli-
nary Rule (DR) 2-101(B), which prohibited all advertising by
attorneys.57
Upon review by the Arizona Supreme Court, the regulation was
upheld against claims that it violated the first amendment.58 The court
relied on the distinction drawn in Virginia Pharmacy between advertis-
ing by pharmacists and that of other professionals. 59 Special considera-
tions, the state court reasoned, kept attorney advertising outside the
newly recognized first amendment protection of commercial speech.6 °
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed and proclaimed
that there could be no blanket suppression of advertising by
attorneys.6'
The Court considered six justifications for the advertising ban.
The first was the adverse effect of advertising on professionalism.
62
Three separate components were discussed. The first component sug-
gested that advertising would be destructive to the attorney's self-es-
teem.63 Advertising, it was argued, would subjugate the attorney's
sense of duty in serving the public to the commercial aspects of render-
ing legal services. The second component intimated that advertising
would undermine the assumption that attorneys are motivated solely
by concern for their client's welfare.' The final component suggested
that advertising would tarnish the dignified public image of the legal
profession.65 In rejecting the validity of these arguments, the Supreme
Court indicated that few clients believe that attorneys perform services
free of charge. The Bates Court held that publicizing this aspect of the
attorney-client relationship would evoke little unfavorable response in
the consumer of these services.66
The Court next considered the State Bar's contention that attorney
advertising is inherently misleading.67 One aspect of this argument is
that each case undertaken by an attorney is unique, making generaliza-
tions and comparisons difficult, if not deceptive.68 The Court acknowl-
edged the merit of this argument and therefore limited its holding to
allow only advertisement of the prices charged for routine services.6 9
57. Id.; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1976).
58. In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 399, 555 P.2d 640, 645 (1976). The Supreme Court of
Arizona also rejected the contention that the disciplinary rule violated sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act because of its tendency to limit competition.
59. See supra note 50.
60. In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976).
61. Bates, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), rev'g 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976).
62. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-72.
63. Id at 368.
64. Id
65. Id
66. Id at 368-69.
67. Id. at 372-75.
68. Id at 372-73.
69. The Court never fully defined a "routine" service. Rather, the Court merely ap-
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Another aspect of this argument focuses on the concern that irrelevant
information would be featured while relevant information, such as
skill, would be omitted." While conceding that advertising could not
provide all the pertinent information required to intelligently select an
attorney, the Court suggested that the alternative prohibition would
prevent even this limited amount of valuable information from reach-
ing the public. Limited access to truthful information, the Court deter-
mined, is preferable to total isolation from any information.7 '
The third argument propounded was the adverse impact advertis-
ing would have on the administration of justice.72 Advertising, the
State Bar contended, had the undesirable effect of stirring up litigation.
In dismissing this argument the Court rejected the idea that potential
claims were better left unresolved than remedied through legal chan-
nels.7 3 The Bates Court reinforced its position by stating that one of
the express goals of the ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility (ABA Code) is to make "legal services fully available" to the
public;" one method for making these services known to consumers is
through advertising.7 5
The fourth element, the undesirable economic effect of advertis-
ing,76 presented the least obstacle for the Court. This argument con-
sisted of two parts. The first component suggested that the additional
cost of advertising would ultimately be borne by consumers of legal
services.7 7 The Court answered that the advertising ban itself keeps the
cost of legal services artificially high by isolating attorneys from com-
petition. Lifting the ban would place the various prices before the con-
suming public and thus allow for comparison." The second
component of the economic argument intimated that the cost of adver-
tising would create an entry barrier giving established attorneys an
additional advantage.79 The Bates Court disagreed with this characteri-
zation, stating that absent advertising, attorneys must rely solely on
reputation and referrals from other attorneys. Both require many years
to cultivate, giving an advantage to more established attorneys. Adver-
tising would reduce this advantage by allowing even newly admitted
attorneys to place their names before the general public.8"
proved those services listed in the advertisement at issue: uncontested divorce,
simple adoption, uncontested personal bankruptcy, and change of name. Id at
372.
70. Id at 374-75.
71. Id
72. Id at 375-77.
73. Id at 376.
74. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-1 (1976).
75. Bates, 433 U.S. at 377.
76. Id at 377-78.
77. Id at 377.
78. Id
79. Id at 377-78.
80. Id at 378.
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The fifth argument the Court addressed was the adverse effect of
advertising on the quality of services provided by attorneys.8' It was
argued that to maintain the advertised price, attorneys would tailor
every case to the specific package publicized. The Court responded
that prohibiting advertising is an ineffective way to discourage defec-
tive work. Those attorneys who will compromise the quality of their
work will do so regardless of the ban on advertising.
82
The final argument analyzed by the Court was the difficulty of
enforcement.8 3 Even should a clear definition be found of what consti-
tutes an abuse, requiring an agency to scrutinize the media in an effort
to locate abuses would be a sizeable task. Because consumers are not
versed in legal matters, they would be unable to offer much assistance.
Claims instituted after an abuse had occurred would not provide suffi-
cient deterrence against future abuses. While the Court acknowledged
the difficulties involved, it declared that lifting the ban on advertising
would not change the ethics of the profession. Attorneys would act as
they always had-within ethical bounds. Those who chose to do other-
wise, as always, would be dealt with individually. 4
The Bates Court concluded that none of the proposed arguments
was sufficient to justify the suppression of all advertising by attorneys.
85
The Court deemed the value of the information to the public to out-
weigh the difficulties of defining abuses and of establishing regulations.
Therefore, the Court concluded that truthful advertising by attorneys
would no longer be suppressed.86
As with other forms of commercial speech, attorney advertising
may be suppressed if it is false, deceptive, or misleading.87 Reasonable
restrictions will be allowed on time, place, and manner.8 8 The Court,
however, made clear that due to the durability of commercial speech,
and the special considerations surrounding advertising by the legal pro-
fession, attorney advertising may still be subject to greater and stricter
regulations than are appropriate for other forms of speech.89 Since at-
torneys are practiced in the art of persuasion, consumers need protec-
tion from pressures, subtle or otherwise, that may be introduced into
their decision making process. Moreover, it is difficult to describe pre-
cisely the product an attorney has to sell. Finally, widespread con-
sumer ignorance regarding the legal profession requires that special
care be taken to keep the flow of information especially pure. Ques-
tionable statements of slight informational value, that in other types of
81. Id at 378-79.
82. Id. at 378.
83. Id at 379.
84. Id
85. Id
86. Id at 384.
87. Id. at 383.
88. Id at 384.
89. Id at 383-84.
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advertising might be condoned may, therefore, be restricted in the sen-
sitive area of attorney advertising.90 In some situations supplementa-
tion, such as warnings and disclaimers, may be required.9' The
Supreme Court, however, left to the individual states the task of estab-
lishing the specific regulations required to protect this informational
purpose behind attorney advertising.
D. The ABA's Response to Bates
Shortly before the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Bates,
the ABA Board of Governors established a task force to develop pro-
posals on the subject of attorney advertising.9 2 Two proposals, desig-
nated A and B, were produced. They were carefully drafted to provide
guidelines to prevent abuse of this newly found freedom. Both propos-
als were designed to promote the informed selection of attorneys by
consumers of legal services through the dissemination of pertinent and
truthful information.
Proposal A enumerates specifically the types of factual informa-
tion that may be employed in an advertisement.93 By doing so, con-
sumers of legal services are given the means to compare intelligently
90. Id at 383.
91. Id at 384.
92. Report to the Board of Governors of the Task Force on Lawyer Advertising, 46
U.S.L.W. 1 (Aug. 23, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Report].
93. Id. at 3-9.
DR 2-101 Publicity
(A) A lawyer shall not. . . use. . . any form of public communi-
cation containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-lauda-
tory or unfair statement or claim.
(B) In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a law-
yer by potential consumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish or
broadcast. . . the following information. . . provided that the informa-
tion disclosed by the lawyer . . . complies with DR 2-101(A), and is
presented in a dignified manner:
(1) Name .. .;
(2) One or more fields of law in which the lawyer. . . practices, a
statement that practice is limited to one or more fields of law, or a state-
ment that the lawyer. . . specializes in a particular field of law practice,
to the extent authorized under DR 2-105;
(3) Date and place of birth;
(4) Date and place of admission to the bar of state and federal
courts;
(5) Schools attended .. .
(6) Public or quasi-public offices;
(7) Military service;
(8) Legal authorships;
(9) Legal teaching positions;
(10) Memberships, offices, and committee assignments, in bar
associations;
(11) Membership and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies;
(12) Technical and professional licenses;




the services offered by advertising attorneys. This approved list was
subject to two conditions. First, the advertisement had to be presented
in a dignified manner.94 Second, the advertisement could not contain a
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory, or unfair state-
ment or claim. 9
Although Proposal B employs a different approach, its objective is
the same. Proposal B states: "The attorney-client relationship . . .
should not be established as a result of pressures or deceptions ....
Only unambiguous information relevant to a layperson's decision re-
garding his legal rights or his selection of counsel . . . is appropriate
.... ,,96 It is only when viewed against this background that the
ABA's Proposal B may be understood. The proposal begins: "A law-
yer shall not. . . use. . any form of public communication contain-
ing a false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive statement or claim." 97
The objective of Proposal B is further highlighted by the limita-
(14) Foreign language ability;
(15) Names and addresses of bank references;
(16) With their written consent, names of clients regularly
represented;
(17) Prepaid or group legal services programs in which the lawyer
participates;
(18) Whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are
accepted;
(19) Office and telephone answering service hours;
(20) Fee for an initial consultation;
(21) Availability upon request of a written schedule of fees and/or
an estimate of the fee to be charged for specific services;
(22) Contingent fee rates. provided that the statement discloses
whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of costs;
(23) Range of fees for services, provided that the statement dis-
closes that the specific fee within the range which will be charged will
vary depending upon the particular matter to be handled for each client
and the client is entitled without obligation to an estimate of the fee
within the range likely to be charged, in print size equivalent to the larg-
est print used in setting forth the fee information;
(24) Hourly rate, provided that the statement discloses that the total
fee charged will depend upon the number of hours which must be de-
voted to the particular matter to be handled for each client and the client
is entitled to without obligation an estimate of the fee likely to be
charged, in print size at least equivalent to the largest print used in set-
ting forth the fee information;
(25) Fixed fees for specific legal services, the description of which
would not be misunderstood or be deceptive, provided that the statement
discloses that the quoted fee will be available only to clients whose mat-
ters fall into the services described and that the client is entitled without
obligation to a specific estimate of the fee likely to be charged in print
size at least equivalent to the largest print used in setting forth the fee
information ...
Id at 5.
94. Id DR 2-101(B).
95. Id DR 2-101(A).
96. Id EC 2-9.
97. Id DR 2-101(A).
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tions which follow this broad directive.98 One such limitation states:
"A lawyer shall not. . . use any form of public communication which
.. .is intended or is likely to attract clients by use of showmanship,
puffery, self-laudation or hucksterism, including the use of slogans, jin-
98. DR 2-101 of Proposal B continues:
(B) Without limitation a false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive state-
ment or claim includes a statement or claim which:
(1) Contains a material misrepresentation of fact;
(2) Omits to state any material fact necessary to make the state-
ment, in the light of all circumstances, not misleading;
(3) Is intended or is likely to create an unjustified expectation;
(4) States or implies that a lawyer is a certified or recognized spe-
cialist... ;
(5) Is intended or is likely to convey the impression that the lawyer
is in a position to influence improperly any court, tribunal, or other pub-
lic body or official;
(6) Relates to legal fees other than:
(a) A statement of the fee for initial consultation;
(b) A statement of the fixed or contingent fee charged for a
specific legal service, the description of which would not be misunder-
stood or be deceptive;
(c) A statement of the range of fees for specifically described
legal services, provided there is a reasonable disclosure of all relevant
variables and considerations so that the statement would not be misun-
derstood or be deceptive;
(d) A statement of specified hourly rates, provided the state-
ment makes clear that the total charge will vary according to the number
of hours devoted to the matter;
(e) The availability of credit arrangements; and
(f) A statement of the fees charged by a qualified legal assist-
ance organization in which he participates for specific legal services the
description of which would not be misunderstood or be deceptive; or
(7) Contains a representation or implication that is likely to cause
an ordinary prudent person to misunderstand or be deceived or fails to
contain reasonable warnings or disclaimers necessary to make a repre-
sentation or implication not deceptive.
(C) A lawyer shall not . . . use or participate in the use of any form of
public communication which:
(1) Is intended or is likely to result in a legal action or a legal posi-
tion being asserted merely to harass or maliciously injure another;
(2) Contains statistical data or other information based on past per-
formance or prediction of future success;
(3) Contains a testimonial about or endorsement of a lawyer;
(4) Contains a statement of opinion as to the quality of the services
or contains a representation or implication regarding the quality of legal
services which is not susceptible of reasonable verification by the public;
(5) Appeals primarily to a layperson's fear, greed, desire for re-
venge, or similar emotion; or
(6) Is intended or is likely to attract clients by use of showmanship,
puffery, self-laudation or hucksterism, including the use of slogans, jin-
gles or garish or sensational language or format; or
(7) Utilizes television until [the agency having jurisdiction under
state law] shall have determined that the use of such media is necessary
in light of the existing provisions of the Code, accords with standards of
accuracy, reliability and truthfulness, and would facilitate the process of
informed selection of lawyers by potential consumers of legal services.
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gles or garish or sensational language or format."99 By negative impli-
cation, this suggests that only data which are factually verifiable by
consumers, such as that enumerated in Proposal A, be employed so as
to enable consumers to compare attorney services through the informa-
tion presented in their advertisements. Another possible inference
from the language of Proposal B is that the advertising must be
presented in a dignified, professional manner.'l°
Another of the proposed limitations contained in Proposal B
would ban "statements of opinion as to the quality of the services...
which [are] not susceptible of reasonable verification by the public."''
As quality is a spectral concept and seldom verifiable, statements such
as these would provide no assistance to the consuming public. Also
suggested is a ban on the use of "statistical data or other information
based on past performance or prediction of future success."' 2 These
types of data are of little informational value and would only focus
attention on irrelevant factors which would be highly prejudicial.
These limitations mirror those set forth in Proposal A. In total,
they also suggest that the information be presented in a dignified man-
ner and that the advertisement not contain a false, fraudulent, or mis-
leading representation. The purpose and direction of the second
proposal is achieved only through these and the remaining limitations.
Without them, Proposal B does no more than restate the obvious: that
commercial speech which is false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive
is outside the protection of the first amendment.
10 3
After Bates, the ABA adopted Proposal A and incorporated it as
part of its new Model Code of Professional Responsibility.'04 Since
both proposals were circulated among the states, each state could select
the one most suited to its interpretation of Bates.
III. MARYLAND'S RESPONSE TO BATES
Prior to Bates, Maryland Rules prohibited an attorney from "pub-
liciz[ing] himself. . . as a lawyer."'' i 5 Because Bates rendered this pro-
hibition unconstitutional, the Maryland Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure (Rules Committee) submitted to the Court of
Appeals of Maryland its recommended rule changes which included
99. Report, supra note 92, at 11; DR 2-101(c)(6).
100. Although the Bates Court rejected the suggestion that advertising would tarnish
the image of the profession as being an insufficient justification for proscribing
attorney advertising altogether, it is a permissible "manner" restriction once the
proscription is eliminated.
101. Report, supra note 92, at 11; DR 2-101(a)(4).
102. Report, supra note 92, at 11; DR 2-101(c)(2).
103. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976).
104. 46 U.S.L.W. 2089 (Aug. 23, 1977).
105. DR 2-101(B), MD. R.P. APPENDIX F, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1983).
19831
Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 13
portions of both Proposals A and B." °
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, on its own motion, submitted
rule changes in place of those recommended by the Rules Commit-
tee. 1 7 The court of appeals employed the concept of ABA Proposal B,
but retained only the bare "false, fraudulent and misleading" standard.
The court's version read:
A lawyer shall not prepare . . . any advertisment which:
1. contains a misstatement of fact;
2. is likely to mislead or deceive because in context it
makes only a partial disclosure of relevant facts;
3. is intended or is likely to create false or unjustified
expectations of favorable results;
106. After stating the following, the Rules Committee listed 14 specifics as to the infor-
mation allowed to be incorporated in an advertisement:
(A) In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by
potential clients, a lawyer may publish. . . the following information in
newspapers or periodicals, provided that the information disclosed by
the lawyer in such publication complies with DR 2-101(B), and is
presented in a dignified manner.
It then continued:
(B) Although a lawyer may publish the information permitted by DR 2-
101(A) and DR 2-102, a lawyer shall not . . . use or participate in the
use of, any form of advertising which:
(1) Contains any representation that is false, deceptive or mislead-
ing, or omits a material fact necessary to make the representation not
misleading, in light of the circumstances;
(2) Contains biographical or fee information other than that au-
thorized by DR 2-10 1(A), or any representation as to the quality of legal
services offered;
(3) Contains any promise, guarantee or assurance of success in
achieving a desired result or of the likelihood of success, or a statement
of the result in any prior or pending legal proceeding;
(4) Generates the impression that it is not an advertisement by the
lawyer; or contains any implication that the communication or the offer
made by it is officially approved, or that the lawyer is in a position im-
properly to influence any court, tribunal, or other public body or official;
(5) Contains any offer of a fee arrangement rendered illegal by stat-
ute or by the Code of Professional Responsibility;
(6) Contains any contract form contemplating execution by the re-
cipient or offers of discount coupons, bonuses, premiums, bargains, and
seasonal or temporary rates;
(7) Contains information the primary purpose of which is to solicit
or obtain professional employment by a particular person or organiza-
tion or for a specific matter, occurrence or transaction;
(8) Is intended or is likely to attract clients by use of showmanship,
puffery, self-laudation or hucksterism, including the use of slogans, or
garish or sensational language or format; or is intended or likely to ap-
peal primarily to fear, greed, or desire for revenge, or similar emotions;
(9) Contains any fee information which does not include a state-
ment to the effect that a client must pay all expenses of litigation. . ..
4 Md. Admin. Reg. 1723-24 (1977).
107. 1 MD. R.P. 88 (Court of Appeals of Maryland Orders Adopting Rules of Proce-
dure and Practice) (1983).
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4. contains any other statement that is intended or
likely to cause a reasonable person to misunderstand or be
deceived; or
5. constitutes, is part of, or is a device for carrying out,
an otherwise unlawful act.' °8
Recognizing the need for further elaboration and restriction so as
to comport with the guidelines established in the ABA proposals, the
Rules Committee suggested the addition of several limitations. In per-
tinent part, these limitations prohibited advertising by lawyers which:
6. is intended or is likely to result in a legal action or a
legal position being asserted merely to harass or maliciously
injure another;
7. contains a testimonial about or endorsement of a
lawyer;
8. contains a statement of opinion as to the quality of
the services or contains a representation or implication re-
garding the quality of legal services which is not susceptible of
reasonable verification by the public;
9. appeals primarily to fear, greed, desire for revenge,
or similar emotion;
10. generates the impression that it is not an advertise-
ment by the lawyer;
11. contains any implication that the communication or
the offer made by it is officially approved; or is intended or is
likely to convey the impression that the lawyer is in a position
to influence improperly any court, tribunal, or other public
body or official .... 'L
The above guidelines were intended to add flesh and contour to
the skeletal frame proposed by the court. The court, however, declined
to incorporate these suggestions and, instead, adopted the bare stan-
dard which it had originally proposed."'
In his dissent to the adoption of the rules, Chief Judge Murphy
declared that this barren regulation "falls woefully short" of that re-
quired in the field of attorney advertising. I"' He further explained that
the regulation as adopted is so "loose and lacking in necessary specific
restraints as to be plainly antithetical to the public interest and to the
interest of the legal profession., ' 2 Chief Judge Murphy stated that the
108. 5 Md. Admin. Reg. 56 (1978) (emphasis in original).
109. 1 MD. R.P. 90 (Court of Appeals of Maryland Orders Adopting Rules of Proce-
dure and Practice) (1983) (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
110. Judges Smith, Digges, Levine, Eldridge, and Orth comprised the majority needed
to adopt the bare standard. Chief Judge Murphy and Judge Cole dissented, sug-
gesting that the court instead adopt the more elaborate standard of the Rules
Committee.





suggestions of the Rules Committee are "essential to the meaningful
and effective regulation of lawyer advertising."'"1 3 Without these sug-
gestions, advertising of legal services is left indistinguishable from ad-
vertising of consumer products." 4
IV. ANALYSIS
The major rationale behind both the demise of the commercial
speech doctrine and the lifting of restrictions on attorney advertising is
to provide consumers with the facts and information necessary to make
informed decisions. Maryland's adoption of the bare antifraud stan-
dard, devoid of the guidelines and limitations which give it substance
and dimension, emasculates this laudable purpose.
The Virginia Pharmacy decision acknowledged that states have au-
thority to promulgate stricter regulations for commercial speech than
for ordinary speech. Thereafter, the Bates Court, after weighing the
special circumstances surrounding attorney advertising, recognized that
this advertising may be even more strictly regulated than other forms of
commercial speech. Maryland, at least from the skeletal language
adopted in the regulation, apparently does not differentiate between at-
torney advertising and other forms of commercial speech. Although
the ethical considerations of the Maryland Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (Maryland Code) clearly enunciate an attempt to conform
to the strictest level of regulation, these ethical considerations are only
aspirational. 5 The disciplinary rules, which are mandatory in charac-
ter, have been stripped of their effectiveness and thus set only a mini-
mum standard which all advertising must satisfy. Had the ABA
intended to limit Proposal B to this minimum standard, it would have
been a needless exercise. All advertising, be it for fungible products or
intangible services, must be truthful to meet this basic standard. The
ABA's Proposal B was designed to accomplish much more. Its pur-
pose, as indicated by accompanying qualifications and limitations, was
to require attorneys who advertise to conform to a more exacting stan-
dard, one which would require that they provide only factual informa-
tion for consumers to digest and compare. Specifically, attorney
advertisements may not persuade through gimmickery or device but
may only present pertinent information to the consumers of legal serv-
ices. Without mandatory limitations, Maryland attorneys need not as-
pire to conform to this more stringent standard.
Little decisional law can be found in Maryland since the 1978 revi-
sion of Canon 2. The decisional law that has evolved indicates a will-
ingness by the court of appeals to protect the rationale behind, not
113. Id. at 90.
114. Id




merely the express language of, the regulation." 6 For example, in In
re Petition for Certicate of Authorization for Corporate Name-
Oldtowne Legal Clinic, P.A. ,'17 the Court of Appeals of Maryland rec-
ognized that it is the informational value of the speech that is protected,
not the speech itself." 8 Although not directly dealing with attorney
advertising, the case illustrates the court's willingness to protect con-
sumers of legal services. In Oldtowne, a professional corporation
sought to use Oldtowne Legal Clinic as the corporate name. Discipli-
nary Rule 2-102(A) of the Maryland Code, however, prohibits the use
of trade names." 9 Citing Bates and Virginia Pharmacy, the incorpora-
tors contended that their trade name was a form of commercial speech
and was not inherently deceptive; therefore, they argued its use could
not be prohibited. 120 The court disagreed, stating that a trade name has
no intrinsic meaning as did the statements about the products and the
services advertised in Bates and Virginia Pharmacy. 12' A trade name,
the court determined, acquires a secondary meaning in the mind of the
public and becomes associated with some standard of price and quality.
Because this can be easily manipulated, it creates a fertile ground for
abuse.' 22 Although the use of a trade name is prohibited, attorneys
remain free to communicate the factual information which could have
been conveyed by the trade name, such as the type and price of services
offered and the nature of the practice. The court stated that this type of
"informational advertising" was protected by Bates and Virginia
Pharmacy. 123
In 1982, the court of appeals in Barnett v. Maryland State Board of
Dental Examiners 24 reinforced the notion that the information the
speech conveys is itself protected. The Barnett court held that to pro-
tect the informational function of advertising, a state could prohibit
communications of questionable informational value.' 25 The commu-
nication at issue was a word, "polydontics," coined by the dentist to
convey his belief that the services he offered were more comprehensive
than those offered by other dentists. 26 The word appeared in several
116. See, e.g., Barnett v. Maryland State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 293 Md. 361, 444
A.2d 1013 (1982); In re Petition for Certificate of Authorization for Corporate
Name--Oldtowne Legal Clinic, P.A., 285 Md. 132, 400 A.2d 1111 (1979).
117. 285 Md. 132, 400 A.2d 1111 (1979).
118. Id at 139-40, 400 A.2d at 1116.
119. DR 2-102(A) states: "A lawyer in private practice shall not practice under a trade
name ....
120. Oldtowne, 285 Md. at 135-36, 400 A.2d at 1114.
121. Id at 139, 400 A.2d at 1116 (quoting Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12-13
(1979)).
122. Oldtowne, 285 Md. at 139, 400 A.2d at 1116.
123. Id. After reciting at length the facts and holding of Friedman, the Oldtowne court
adopted the Supreme Court's rationale.
124. 293 Md. 361, 444 A.2d 1013 (1982).
125. Id. at 367, 444 A.2d at 1016.
126. Id at 364, 444 A.2d at 1014.
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advertisements with a legend defining it.' 2 7 The Board of Dental Ex-
aminers believed the term to be misleading and charged him with vio-
lating a state law' 28 that defines dishonorable or unprofessional
conduct of a dentist as "making use of any advertising statements of a
character tending to deceive or mislead the public."' 29 After a hearing,
the Board found the dentist guilty of deceptive advertising. 1
30
In his argument before the court of appeals, the dentist contended
that his first amendment right of free speech had been abridged be-
cause the advertisement was commercial speech and therefore constitu-
tionally protected. 13 1 While the court agreed that commercial speech
enjoys limited constitutional protection, it announced that this protec-
tion is "based on the informational function of advertising."'' 32 Despite
the legend supplied by the dentist in his advertisements, the court
found that the term "polydontics" was capable of leading consumers to
believe that he was a specialist and thus in possession of a greater
amount of knowledge than the average dentist. 3 3 The Barnett court
determined that this deceptive tendency outweighed the informational
value to the public. Thus, as in Oldtowne, a professional advertiser is
not entitled to use whatever language he desires in communicating his
message. To ensure that only factual information is presented, courts
will carefully scrutinize both the message and the methods used.
Despite the ineffective guidance the Maryland regulation gives to
attorneys who advertise, it appears that Maryland courts will resort not
only to the express language of the regulation, but also to the purpose
for which it was intended to accomplish. Although encouraging, this
case-by-case regulation is not sufficient. New guidelines must be devel-
oped so that attorneys are aware of the standard under which their ad-
vertisements will be judged. The Maryland regulation of attorney
advertising, DR 2-101, should be amended to conform to the stricter
and more concrete standards enunciated in ABA Proposal B.
134
Through these and similar limitations may be gleaned the true purpose
127. A different legend was used in each of the three advertisements. They read: (1)
"A word we created for the Individualized, Comprehensive, Preventive, and Cor-
rective care for adults and children in all areas of general dentistry..."; (2) "A
word we created for comprehensive care of the patient with multiple dental
problems"; and (3) "A word that we have created to stand for individualized care,
diagnostic, therapeutic and preventive for the patient with multiple kinds of den-
tal problems." Id at 371, 444 A.2d at 1018.
128. Id. at 363, 444 A.2d at 1014. Article 32 was repealed by 1981 MD. LAW 8, effective
July 1, 1981. The current provisions concerning dentistry are contained at MD.
HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 4-101 to -702 (1981).
129. MD. ANN. CODE art. 32, § I l(k)(1) (1976).
130. Barnett v. Maryland State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 293 Md. 361, 365, 444 A.2d
1013, 1015 (1982).
131. Id. at 366, 444 A.2d at 1015.
132. Id (quoting from Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Communica-
tions of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)).
133. Barnett, 293 Md. at 376, 444 A.2d at 1020.
134. See supra note 97.
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behind the lifting of barriers behind attorney advertising. Without
them, regulations on attorney advertising are left indistinguishable
from those pertaining to all other forms of speech, and the courts are
left with a task which should have been resolved by regulations.
V. CONCLUSION
Properly regulated attorney advertising is a valuable resource for
consumers of legal services. Maryland consumers, however, have been
deprived of the full utility of this advertising. Current Maryland regu-
lations do not provide attorneys with incentive to conform to the infor-
mational purpose behind the allowance of attorney advertising.
Maryland attorneys have been given the freedom to incorporate per-
suasive language and techniques into their advertisements; this same
freedom effectively negates the informational purpose of advertising.
For Maryland to bring its attorney advertising in line with that in-
tended by the Supreme Court in Bates, stricter regulations need to be
adopted. Only through the enforcement of carefully drafted regula-
tions can attorney advertising fulfill its purpose-to inform.
Carol Kaufmann Lisman
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